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AMENDING NEPA: STATE PREPARATION OF IMPACT 
STATEMENTS 
Andrew Quartner* 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 11, 1974, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
handed down Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. 
Secretary of Transportation, I a decision which prompted the first 
direct amendment of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA)2 since its enactment in 1969. In Conservation Society the 
Second Circuit invalidated Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) procedures which allowed the state applicant for federal-
aid highway funds to prepare the NEPA-required environmental 
impact statement (EIS).3 In ruling that preparation of an impact 
statement was an exclusively federal duty, the court reached a re-
sult contradictory to those reached by several other circuits. This 
disparity among the federal courts of appeal, combined with a crisis 
in the highway construction industry in the states of the Second 
Circuit, created pressure for legislative action which culminated in 
passage, nine months later, of Public Law 94-83 amending NEPA.4 
* B.A., Yale University; J.D. (expected 1977), Columbia University Law School. 
I 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 809 (1975) for reconsidera-
tion in light of Pub. L. No. 94-83 (1975) and Aberdeen & Rockfish RR v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 
289 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Conservation Society]. The subsequent decision on remand 
was issued at 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976). 
2 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970). 
3 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974). 
• The legislative history of Pub. L. No. 94-83 includes: H. R. Rep. No. 144, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1975) (Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries) [hereinafter cited as House 
Report]; H.R. Rep. No. 388, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and S. Rep. No. 331, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1975) (Comm. on Conference) [hereinafter cited as Conference Report]; S. Rep. 
No. 152, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs) [hereinafter 
cited as Senate Report]; Hearings on EIS Amendment, H.R. 3128, H.R. 3130, H.R. 3787, 
H.R.3968, H.R. 4159, H.R. 4192, Before Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife Conservation, and 
the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; Joint Hearings Before Subcomm. of 
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In contrast to the firm stance taken in the Second Circuit, this 
amendment allows state preparation of impact statements under 
certain circumstances. In February 1976, the Second Circuit, obli-
gated to reconsider its decision in Conservation Society in light of 
the new law, reversed itself in a terse, per curiam decision.5 
The Second Circuit, in its original application of NEPA, looked 
first to see if the federal agency had prepared the impact statement. 
By allowing state authorship, this amendment eliminates a simple 
threshold test for measuring the sufficiency of an impact statement, 
and thus represents legislative sanction of an erosion ofNEPA. The 
most meaningful requirement in the investigative process de-
manded by NEPA is the preparation of a detailed impact statement 
containing the results of an analysis of the project and its alterna-
tives with respect to critical subject areas outlined by the Act.8 
Theoretically, this impact statement forms the basis for later deci-
sions of how, and even whether, to proceed with a planned project. 
Through framing the issues, generating and displaying data, and 
choosing materials to be included in the impact statement, the offi-
cial preparing the statement has an opportunity to slant the EIS 
either in favor of or against the proposed action.7 Responsibility for 
authoring the document is thus of major importance to state and 
regional development projects, and ultimately to the effective func-
tioning of NEPA. 
This article will deal with six topics: 1) NEPA itself and its imple-
menting guidelines, with particular attention to the issue of delega-
tion of the responsibility to prepare impact statements; 2) the case 
history on the subject of delegation; 3) the legislative histO'ry of the 
NEPA amendment; 4) the amendment as enacted and suggestions 
for its interpretation; 5) the problems created by delegation; and 6) 
the outlook for the future. 
Transp. of Sen. Comm. on Pub. Works and Environment and Land Resources Subcomm. of 
Sen. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited 
as Senate Hearings]; 121 CONGo REc. 2994 (daily ed. April 21, 1975) (considered and passed 
in the House); 121 CONGo REc. 8928 (daily ed. May 22, 1975) (considered and passed in the 
Senate); 121 CONGo REc. 13758 (daily ed. July 25,1975) (Senate agreed to Conference Report); 
121 CONGo REc. 7741 (daily ed. July 29, 1975) (House agreed to Conference Report); 121 CONGo 
REC. 1021 (daily ed., Sept. 3, 1975) (final approval granted Aug. 9, 1975). See also 121 CONGo 
REc. 7450 (daily ed. July 24, 1975), 121 CONGo REC. 4158 (daily ed. July 25, 1975), and 121 
CONGo REC. 4399 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975). 
5 531 F.2d 637, 640 (2d Cir. 1976). 
• 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(1970). 
7 Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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I. NEPA AND THE ISSUE OF DELEGATION 
A facial examination of NEPA indicates that Congress intended 
that federal officials prepare the mandated impact statements. The 
Act requires ". . . all agencies of the Federal Government. . ." to 
include in proposals for major federal actions". . . a detailed state-
ment by the responsible official . .. "8 (emphasis added) assessing 
the environmental impact of the proposed action and its alterna-
tives. The Federal Highway Administration and other federal agen-
cies have seized on the omission of the modifier "federal" before 
"responsible official" to justify delegation of NE,PA duties to local 
officials. The absence of the modifier "federal," however, was prob-
ably not intended to be significant. First, if Congress intended 
thereby to permit state preparation of impact statements, this fact 
would have been highlighted in the legislative history of NEPA; it 
is not even mentioned.9 Second, even if the missing modifier "fed-
eral" was noticed when NEPA was enacted, the word may simply 
have been considered redundant in the context of the sentence and 
therefore unnecessary. Finally, viewing the issue from a broader 
perspective, it is arguable that only by preparing the EIS itself can 
the federal government faithfully discharge the responsibilities as-
signed to it throughout the Act, and thereby guarantee the integrity 
of the process of study the Act established. 
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the agency 
charged with implementing NEPA, consistently had avoided the 
issue of delegation in the earliest sets of its guidelines issued to 
assist federal agencies in executing their responsibilities under 
NEPA.t° Finally, in the latest revision of these guidelines, the issue 
was indirectly addressed. l1 In its fifth annual report, CEQ claimed 
that it traditionally had no objection to delegation if some safe-
guards were employed, but the exact position of CEQ remains un-
clear. 12 
• 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(1970). 
• Legislative history is compiled in 1969 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 2751. 
10 Interim guidelines were issued April 30, 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970); first final set were 
issued April 23, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971); revised guidelines were issued August 1,1973, 
38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (1973) and now appear at 40 C.F.R. § 1500 et seq. (1975). 
" 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(c) (1975). In 1974 CEQ issued a Legal Report on the issue of delega-
tion. This document, which suggested that delegation procedures were acceptable if certain 
safeguards were taken, was merely a legal memorandum assessing judicial enforcement of 
NEPA and was not explicitly a CEQ policy statement. CEQ, LEGAL REPORT 8 (Sept. 5,1974). 
12 Delegation is proper". . . where the Federal agency has maintained responsibility for 
the objectivity and adequacy of the statement. . ." though it remains the continuing respon-
sibility of the federal agency to ". . . ensure that environmental considerations are meaning-
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II. CASE HISTORY 
The Conservation Society case involved the construction of a 
twenty-mile segment of highway by the Vermont Highway Depart-
ment (VHD) financed by a federal grant under the Federal-Aid 
Highway Act. 13 The FHWA allowed the VHD to prepare the re-
quired impact statement. 14 In consideration of the project's EIS 
preparation the district court noted: "There is no indication what-
soever that FHW A or any of its employees conceived, wrote, or even 
edited any section of or passage in the EIS." The FHWA role con-
sisted only of "informal chats touching on the subject, together with 
... [a] field trip .... "15 
In reviewing the lower court's decision, the Second Circuit found 
that the state agency was "established to pursue defined state goals, 
... " and that" ... 'self-serving assumptions' may ineluctably 
color a state agency's presentation of the environmental data."16 
Indeed, the VHD was under a 1968 state legislative mandate to 
build the road.17 Delegation would thus be unlikely to produce as 
" ... dispassionate an appraisal of environmental considerations as 
the federal agency itself could produce .... "18 The Court relied 
upon its prior landmark decision in Greene County Planning Board 
v. Federal Power Commission,19 stating that: "Nothing short of 
'genuine' federal preparation of the EIS accords with Greene 
County. "20 
fully integrated into the project's design .... " The exact extent of federal participation 
desired is left unspecified; there must be ". . . at least some review of the project and the 
impact statement by the agency ... " though not (in every case) " ... independent prepara. 
tion of the impact statement." 5 CEQ ANN. REP. 397-98 (1974). 
13 23 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927, 929 
(2d Cir. 1974). Most cases involving the issue of delegation deal with the construction of roads 
and highways under the Federal-Aid Highway Program. In 1974 the Department of Transpor-
tation [DOT] filed 360 EIS's out of a total of 1137 from all agencies. CEQ estimates 184 DOT 
EIS's out of a total of 1476 in 1975. 6 CEQ ANN. REp. 23 (1975) (draft). 
" Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927, 932 (2d Cir. 1974). Dep't. of 
Transp. PPM 90-1, § 6(b) provides for this delegation, 39 Fed. Reg. 41805 (1974), 23 C.F.R. 
§§ 771.12(a), 771.14 (a)(1975). 
15 Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp. 362 F.Supp. 627, 632 (D.Vt. 1973) . 
.. Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1974). 
" 362 F. Supp. 627, 635 (D. Vt. 1973). 
" 508 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1974). 
" 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Greene 
County). 
20 Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp. 508 F.2d 927, 932 (2d Cir. 1974). This hard-
line approach is repeated in other Second Circuit opinions as well. E.g., Steubing v. Brinegar, 
511 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1975) and 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Bums, 517 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1975). In 
the latter, the court reiterated its dissatisfaction with FHWA procedures, although the brief, 
per curiam decision did indicate some tolerance for state participation. 517 F.2d at 1078. 
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In Greene County the Second Circuit found that the Federal 
Power Commission (FPC) had ". . . abdicated a significant part 
of its responsibility ... " under NEPA by maintaining procedures 
that allowed the applicant for a license to operate a power station 
to prepare the draft EIS in uncontested cases. 21 According to the 
court, NEPA made consideration of environmental values the "pri-
mary and nondelegable responsibility" of the federal agency, and 
one danger of the FPC procedures here was ". . . the potential, if 
not likelihood, that the applicant's statement will be based on self-
serving assumptions. "22 
A. Other Circuits 
Subsequent decisions, even those allowing delegation, have ac-
knowledged the authority of the holding in Greene County. Several 
courts, however have strained to distinguish Greene County while 
upholding particular impact statements. 23 Although paying lip serv-
ice to Greene County, other courts seem simply to disagree with its 
reading of NEPA: 
Inasmuch as section 102(2)(C) does not explicitly require that a federal 
official prepare the EIS, this court cannot find as a matter of law that 
preparation of the EIS by the HA [state highway authority] is a viola-
tion of the spirit or mandate of NEPA.24 
21 Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.s. 849 (1972). 
22 Id. at 422. Another danger was that such procedures might place the burden of providing 
effective analysis of environmental factors on intervenors whose resources were generally 
limited, rather than upon the Commission, as Congress had intended. Similarly, in Harlem 
Valley Transp. Ass'n. v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974), the Interstate Commerce 
Commission's failure to provide in its regulations for the circulation of a draft EIS prepared 
by its own staff, before administrative hearings, violated NEPA requirements as explicated 
in Greene County. 
23 Three courts have assumed the legality of delegation with little or no discussion: Finish 
Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v. Brinegar, 484 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1973); Citizens Environ-
mental Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); and 
Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974). Three other courts have 
found CEQ and congressional acquiescence in FHWA procedures and cited this fact in sup-
port of their decisions: Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 
859 (8th Cir. 1973); Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 364 F.Supp. 286, 294 (D. Kan. 
1973); and National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F.Supp. 123, 127 (D. Mont. 
1972). Red Tape-Inquiring into Delays and Excessive Paperwork in Administration of Public 
Works Programs, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House 
Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., (1971) includes the testimony of Russell Train, 
then Chairman of the CEQ, on FHW A impact statement procedures. 
24 National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F.Supp. 123, 127 (D.Mont. 1972). 
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Implicit in this conclusion, and in the reasoning of most courts when 
not applying the Greene County rule to the federal-aid highway 
program, are three distinctions. First is the presumption that a state 
applicant for federal funds will not be as likely to be motivated by 
selfish purposes as a typical applicant for a federal license, and 
hence can be relied on to produce an even-handed assessment of the 
environmental consequences of the proposed project. 25 Second, 
courts acknowledge that the modus operandi of the FHW A is dif-
ferent from that of other federal agencies because it must rely pri-
marily on state highway departments to plan and construct high-
ways.26 Finally, and most importantly, these courts generally find 
that the FHW A, unlike the Federal Power Commission in Greene 
County, does not give mere "rubber stamp" approval to an EIS but 
rather substantially participates in its preparation, and then re-
views, approves, and adopts the statement as its own. Courts con-
clude that this procedure prevents the dangers that concerned the 
Greene County court.27 
These cases, however, never really detail what constitutes the 
substantial participation or the review and adoption by the FHW A. 
This suggests that these courts either were satisfied with very lim-
ited federal participation or merely accepted on faith the proposi-
tion that FHW A regulations are followed. Thus the findings of these 
courts, that sufficient safeguards are present to prevent the writing 
of self-serving statements, or that the agency procedures are ade-
quate to ensure extensive federal involvement in the EIS prepara-
tion, are not convincing. For example, in Citizens Environmental 
Council v. Volpe the Tenth Circuit relied upon the district court's 
characterization of FHWA involvement as substantial in order to 
distinguish Greene County.28 The district court, however, did not 
specify the exact nature of the federal participation. It merely noted 
that the "record discloses" that the EIS has been prepared by the 
state highway authority in cooperation with the FHW A. 29 
Similarly in Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v . 
.. [d. at 126. 
" Id. at 125. See also Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 364 F.Supp. 286, 293 (D. 
Kan. 1973). This is contrasted, e.g., with the Army Corps of Engineers which plans and 
develops its projects independently. 
27 See discussion of cases, notes 28-39 and accompanying text, infra. This requirement of 
participation was enacted into the new amendment. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text, 
infra. 
2M 484 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). 
" Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 364 F. Supp. 286, 293 (D. Kan. 1973). 
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Volpe the Eighth Circuit concluded that "review, modification, and 
adoption by the FHWA as its own ... " of the challenged impact 
statement provided adequate federal participation without indicat-
ing what warranted this conclusion.30 Remarking that the district 
court relied on "substantial evidence" of participation by the 
responsibile federal agency, the court of appeals was satisfied that 
Greene County had been distinguished.31 Again, however, a reading 
of the district court opinion reveals a similar absence of supporting 
facts or explanation. The holding is a spare statement that this was 
not an instance of rubber stamp approval but a case of true federal 
participation.32 
In National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe a federal district 
court in Montana was satisfied with merely reading Department of 
Transportation regulations without inquiring whether these had re-
sulted in any significant federal involvement in that case.33 In 
Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe another district court re-
counted in depth three years of joint federal and local activity re-
garding the project and concluded that FHWA "officials were in a 
position to evaluate objectively the materials gathered in the EIS."34 
There is little detail, however, about actual FHWA participation in 
the writing of the document. The circuit court summarily affirmed 
in a per curiam opinion.35 
On the other hand, some courts have attempted to document the 
level of federal participation. In Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right 
Inc. v. Brinegar the Fifth Circuit pointed to a concentrated analysis 
by an FHWA study team.36 In Life of the Land v. Brinegar the Ninth 
Circuit noted that federal officials attended regular meetings re-
garding the EISY In Sierra Club v. Lynn an interdisciplinary team 
3. 487 F.2d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1973). A similarly unsubstantiated conclusion is reached in 
the district court decision in Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v. Brinegar, 355 F. 
Supp. 933, 938 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
31 Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1973). 
32 Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe 3 E.L.R. 20013,20016 (S.D. Ia. 
1972). 
32 352 F. Supp. 123, 127 (D. Mont. 1972). 
34 361 F. Supp. 1361, 1369, 1393 (D. Md. 1973). 
35 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974). 
3B 484 F.2d 638,639 (5th Cir. 1973). 
37 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973). This case is noteworthy for 
another aspect of its holding. Despite the fact that a private consulting firm participated in 
the drafting of the EIS, and ignoring the warning in Greene County about self-serving state-
ments, the court found no bar in NEPA to the delegation which occurred in this instance. 
Although even CEQ found the case aberrational in its LEGAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 8, 
delegation to a private concern occurred once again in Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 59 
278 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:271 
of Housing and Urban Development staff members compiled and 
prepared each of three environmental statements. In addition, HUD 
retained a geologist and his staff associates to obtain further verifi-
cation and analysis of environmental studies and to review every 
aspect of the project. The Fifth Circuit found that thi~ was sufficient 
federal participation.38 Likewise the Fourth Circuit, in Fayetteville 
Area Chamber of Commerce v. Volpe, sustained delegation proce-
dures, calling attention to field inspections, erosion control recom-
mendations, and instructions regarding the incorporation of CEQ 
comments, all made by the FHW A, as well as joint meetings to 
determine design concept and to review the draft statement.3D 
B. Post-Conservation Society Courts 
In addition to the Fayetteville court, three other courts have ad-
dressed the issue of delegation since the Conservation Society deci-
sion.40 In Swain v. Brinegar the Seventh Circuit went beyond the 
Second Circuit in announcing that delegation of either the drafting 
or the researching of the initial EIS violates NEPA.41 A district court 
in New Hampshire held that while courts may differ on exactly what 
level of participation the federal agency must undertake, " ... 
there is no question that the federal agency must play an active 
role .... "42 That court found that the federal agency improperly 
substituted the applicant's efforts and analysis for its own.43 Finally, 
the Massachusetts district court in Essex County Preservation Asso-
ciation v. Campbell unqualifiedly praised the content, comprehen-
siveness, clarity, and documentation of the EIS under scrutiny.44 In 
addition, the court found "considerable federal review, discussion, 
(5th Cir. 1974) where the court stated that absent bad faith, a federal agency" ... cannot 
be expected to ignore useful and relevant information merely because it emanates from an 
applicant." Again no effort was made to square this holding with Greene County. A contrary 
holding is found in Essex County Preservation Ass'n v. Campbell, 399 F. Supp. 208, 212 (D. 
Mass. 1975) where the court invalidated the EIS, citing the danger that essential information 
will be either neglected or disguised when a private firm with a financial interest in the project 
is given the responsibility to gather and collect basic data for the EIS. Despite these contra-
dictory case precedents, Congress neglected to address this issue in H.R. 3130 (See note 77, 
infra). 
,. 502 F.2d 43, 59 (5th Cir. 1974). 
31 515 F.2d 1021, 1025 (4th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Fayetteville] . 
.. The amendment to NEPA was not in effect for any of these cases. 
" 517 F.2d 766,778 (7th Cir. 1975) . 
.. 394 F. Supp. 105, 120 (D. N.H. 1975) . 
.. [d . 
.. 399 F. Supp. 208, 214 (D. Mass. 1975). Here, even the Sierra Club was pleased with the 
EIS. 
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and revision" of the EIS as it was being developed.45 Nevertheless, 
the court invalidated the impact statement because in its view the 
delegation of certain responsibilities to a private design engineer 
violated NEPA procedures.46 
At the same time, however, that courts in several circuits, follow-
ing the lead of the Second Circuit, were becoming less inclined to 
accept FHW A delegation procedures, the FHW A was mobilizing 
forces on another front. The result was legislation which supercedes 
a good deal of this case history. The case history remains important, 
however, since key provisions of the legislation are derived from 
these opinions. 
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
At the time Conservation Society was handed down, standard 
FHWA practices did not satisfy the level of active participation in 
EIS preparation which the Second Circuit demanded. FHWA was 
intially reluctant to continue projects in the Second Circuit which 
required impact statements because after Conservation Society any 
of these projects could be enjoined for insufficient federal participa-
tion. Thus, shortly after the decision, the FHWA ordered a halt to 
virtually all work on projects within the Second Circuit.47 Though 
this order was later modified,48 the original shutdown involved so 
many projects and so many jobs that the construction industry felt 
the impact almost immediately.49 The resultant unemployment cri-
" [d . 
.. [d. 
47 In a letter dated Jan. 2, 1975, Robert Kirby, Regional Federal Highway Administrator, 
instructed Division Engineers in Connecticut, New York, and Vermont to take no project 
approvals and to sign no draft EIS's or negative declarations until further guidelines were 
issued. 
" In letters of Jan. 29 and Feb. 28, 1975, Kirby directed that "projects not specifically 
involved" in Conservation Society could be approved if: (1) CEQ guidelines had been followed 
(see supra note 10), (2) FHWA had given substantive direction to the development of the 
EIS, and (3) the EIS, physically written by FHWA would have been substantially the same 
as that written by the state . 
.. Conservation Society had come at a time when the construction industry was already 
suffering the high unemployment rate of 19.3%. Testimony of Robert G. Georgine, President, 
Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO, Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 
122. The estimates regarding exactly what was involved varied as follows: N.Y. Times, April 
22, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.): 130 projects, $2.3 billion, and 150,000 workers involved; 
Statement by Raymond T. Schuler, Commissioner, New York State Department of Transpor-
tat ion, Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 86: 300,000 jobs and $3.3 billion; letter from Gover-
nor Carey, New York, introduced into record at House Hearings by Raymond T. Schuler: 
71,000 jobs and $2 billion. Furthermore, the situation was exacerbated by the release of $2 
billion in impounded funds from the Highway Trust Fund, announced Feb. 11, 1975. 
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sis in the construction industry, as well as FHWA's reluctance to 
assume the responsibilities assigned to it by the Second Circuit, 
provided the impetus for Congressional action. Despite assurances 
from the FHW A in subsequent memoranda that fewer projects, in 
fact, were affected, the Second Circuit states remained reluctant to 
commit funds to projects which might still be halted. An employ-
ment versus the environment standoff had emerged. 
For several reasons, environmentalists insisted that legislation 
was an inappropriate solution to the problem. First, environmen-
talists thought that Supreme Court review would provide the proper 
forum in which to resolve the dispute.5o Indeed, as party to 
Conservation Society, the Secretary of Transportation had applied 
for certioriari to the United States Supreme Court. 51 
Second, environmentalists argued that FHWA should not be per-
mitted to mandate a change in a law to relieve a crisis created solely 
by its own noncompliance with that very law.52 Environmentalists 
believed that FHW A had flagrantly violated the law for the previous 
five years. Through its own environmental footdragging, FHWA was 
unable to comply when the Second Circuit finally enforced the letter 
of the law. Thus FHWA itself caused the project shutdowns and the 
spectre of prolonged unemployment. Rather than changing the law 
to accommodate FHW A, environmentalists argued that FHW A 
should change its procedures to conform with the law.53 
Finally, there was significant dispute between state transporta-
tion officials and environmentalists over the total number of jobs 
which were at stake. Some commentators claimed that the list of 
projects allegedly stopped by the Conservation Society decision in-
cluded projects that either were enjoined for other reasons or were 
not presently scheduled for construction.54 Legislative relief, there-
fore, would not restore the vast number of jobs that advocates 
claimed. 
Designed to generate employment and expedite highway construction, the funds were avail-
able on a first-come, first-served basis. 
'" Statement of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Senate Hearings, supra note 4, 
at 46. 
" Petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. June 10, 1975). 
52 Statement of Sara Chasis, Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 43. 
53 [d. See discussion of NEPA itself, supra notes 8, 9 and accompanying text . 
.. For example, in New York and Connecticut, environmentalists claimed that the list of 
projects allegedly affected by the shutdown included some for which the route had not yet 
even been determined, some which may never be built, and some which were halted in 
litigation over other matters. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 6. 
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Legislative action, however, was the course which was taken. The 
first response from Washington, H.R. 3787, emerged in March, 1975 
from the House Public Works and Transportation Committee. The 
bill was unsatisfactory for several reasons: (1) it applied only to New 
York, Vermont, and Connecticut, and hence its narrow scope ig-
nored the possibility that the problem could arise outside the Sec-
ond Circuit (as in fact it did); (2) it was an indirect amendment to 
NEPA, to be added to 23 U.S.C. § 109 (1970); and (3) it went far 
beyond any circuit's application of NEPA by sanctioning complete 
delegation of NEPA responsibilities to state officials. Though H.R. 
3787 passed the House, the bill ultimately died in Senate Com-
mittee."" 
Anxious to prevent erosion of NEPA through indirect amend-
ments, the House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conser-
vation of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee undertook 
hearings to consider direct amendment of NEPA in April, 1975. The 
Committee considered six new bills and reported favorably on H.R. 
3130.56 
Unlike H.R. 3787, H.R. 3130 was a direct and explicit amendment 
to NEPA (to be added as new section 102(b)): 
A statement prepared after January 1, 1970 shall not be deemed to 
legally insufficient solely by reason of having been prepared by a state 
agency or official if the responsible Federal official furnishes guidance 
and participates in such preparation and independently evaluates such 
statement prior to its approval and adoption. This procedure shall not 
relieve the Federal official of his responsibilities for the scope, objectiv-
ity, and content of the statement, nor of any other responsibilities under 
this ActY 
Following passage in the House,58 H.R. 3130 was referred to a joint 
committee of the Interior and Public Works in the Senate, which 
held hearings in May.59 In the interim the Swain and Appalachian 
Mountain Club decisions were handed down.80 The Senate Report 
comments that ". . . the rapidity with which these decisions fol-
" H.R. 3787 passed the House by a vote of 275-99. 121 CONGo REC. 2994 (daily ed. April 
21,1975). The bill was subsequently reported unfavorably in the Senate. Senate Report, supra 
note 4, at 7. 
" House Report, supra note 4, at 3. H.R. 3130 was originally introduced by Rep. John 
LaFalce (N.Y.). 121 CONGo REC. 744 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1975). 
51 The phrasing of this amendment derives partially from the case history discussed supra, 
notes 13-46 and accompanying text, and CEQ regulations, supra note 10 and accompanying 
text. 
" 121 CONGo REC. 2994 (daily ed. April 21, 1975). The bill passed by a vote of 370-5. 
" Supra, note 4. 
'0 Supra, notes 41, 42 and accompanying text. 
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lowed Conservation Society seemed only to increase the concerns of 
those who feared massive interruptions in highway construction, 
with their attendant adverse economic consequences."81 
In considering amendment of NEPA, the Senate reported favor-
ably on H.R. 3130 but with certain changes and limitations.62 First, 
the amendment was made applicable only to "major Federal actions 
funded under a program of grants to states, "83 since even those 
circuits permitting delegation had only done so with respect to EIS's 
written pursuant to this type of federal project.84 Second, the Senate 
specifically mentioned that the only agencies to which delegation 
would not be considered invalid were those with "statewide jurisdic-
tion" and "principal planning and decisionmaking responsibility" 
for the action.85 By means of the limitation the Senate strove to 
express what had been implied in the House bill, citing in support 
a passage from the House Report. 88 Finally, the Senate, while sanc-
tioning delegation under the guidelines established in the modified 
House bill, stipulated in a proviso that there must be independent 
federal preparation of the analysis of any impacts and alternatives 
which were of "major interstate significance."87 
FHWA was particularly displeased with the Senate bill.8s One 
apprehension was that the phrase "major interstate significance," 
in its broadest sense, could be construed to include almost any 
impact, thereby creating the undesired consequence that the pro-
viso would undo the entire effect of the amendment. The first part 
of the amendment would allow delegation if certain guidelines were 
followed, while the appended proviso would prohibit delegation in 
almost every instance.8o 
Since the House and Senate had passed substantially different 
versions of the amendment, two conferences were held to resolve the 
0\ Senate Report, supra note 4, at 6. 
" 121 CONGo REC. 8928 (daily ed. May 22, 1975). 
13 Id . 
•• Supra, notes 23-39 and accompanying text . 
•• 121 CONGo REC. 8928 (daily ed. May 22, 1975). 
" Senate Report, supra note 4, at 9, quoting House Report, supra note 4, at 4. 
" 121 CONGo REC. 8928 (daily ed. May 22, 1975) . 
.. Letter dated May 21, 1975 from Norbert T. Tiemann, Federal Highway Administrator 
to Senators Jackson and Randolph: OJ. • • the proposed Senate report accompanying H.R. 
3130 would destroy the Federal-State relationship in the Federal-aid highway program .... 
The bill as reported is worse than no bill at all." Tiemann noted that implementation would 
require 2000 additional FHWA positions and would impose long delays on all highway pro-
jects . 
.. Fear of this interpretation resulted in the somewhat awkward wording of subsecton (iv) 
in the final version. See notes 92-100 and accompanying text, infra. 
1976] AMENDING NEPA 283 
discrepancies. 70 House conferees felt that, even narrowly inter-
preted, the Senate proviso added a burden to federal agencies that 
did not exist elsewhere. Thus the Senate bill would be creating new 
limitations instead of merely clarifying the requirements of NEPA 
as originally enacted, as was intended by the House.71 Also, despite 
the language in the House Report indicating that delegation was 
only sanctioned to statewide agencies, the House conferees urged 
that this limitation not be expressed in the final version. Their fear 
was that by making the limitation explicit, it would be interpreted 
as exclusive by the courts and delegation to anything other than a 
statewide agency would be deemed improper. The congressional 
intent, however, was simply not to address that type of delegation 
at all, but only to state clearly that FHWA procedures (which pro-
vide for delegation to statewide agencies) were acceptable. 72 Omit-
ting the phrase, and adopting the House language instead, would 
have gone too far the other way, and permitted delegation to any 
state agency, even very localized ones. This would have noticeably 
increased the number of programs affected by the legislation. 
Mter considering these positions, the conferees agreed to the fol-
lowing text, which ultimately became Public Law 94-83 (Redesig-
nating other subparagraphs in section 102(2) and adding the follow-
ing subparagraph): 
(D) Any detailed statement required under subparagraph (C) after 
January 1, 1970, for any major Federal action funded under a program 
of grants to States shall not be deemed to be legally insufficient solely 
by reason of having been prepared by a State agency or official, if: 
(i) the State agency or official has statewide jurisdiction and has the 
responsibility for such action, 
(ii) the responsible Federal official furnishes guidance and participates 
in such preparation, 
(iii) the responsible Federal official independently evaluates such 
statement prior to its approval and adoption, and 
(iv) after January 1, 1976, the responsible Federal official provides 
early notification to, and solicits the views of, any other State or any 
Federal land management entity of any action or any alternative thereto 
7. At the conferences held July 17 and July 22,1975, the Senate Conferees were: Henry M. 
Jackson, Floyd Haskell, Dale Bumpers, Paul J. Fannin, Mark O. Hatfield; and the House 
Conferees were: Leonor K. Sullivan, Robert L. Leggett, John Dingell, John M. Murphy, 
Philip E. Ruppe, Edwin B. Forsythe. 
71 House Report, supra note 4, at 4. This, of course, depends largely on one's perspective. 
If NEPA is read as requiring preparation by the federal official in all instances, then the 
Senate version is less of a change since it allows delegation in fewer cases. 
72 Conference Report, supra note 4, at 4. 
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which may have significant impacts upon such State or affected Federal 
land management entity and, if there is any disagreement on such im-
pacts, prepares a written assessment of such impacts and views for 
incorporation into such detailed statement. 
The procedures in this subparagraph shall not relieve the Federal offi-
cial of his responsibilities for the scope, objectivity, and content of the 
entire statement or of any other responsibility under this Act; and fur-
ther, this subparagraph does not affect the legal sufficiency of state-
ments prepared by State agencies with less than statewide jurisdiction.73 
The text of the final amendment contained several significant 
revisions. First, the phrase "principal planning and decision making 
responsibility," initially included to describe those state agencies 
qualified to prepare EIS's, was deleted from the Senate version. The 
conferees generally agreed that this phrase added little to the pre-
vious version,74 and was much too vague to be included in clarifying 
legislation. Furthermore, complications could arise in states where 
one agency had planning responsibility and another had decision-
making power. 
Second, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, the final ver-
sion includes a disclaimer stipulating that the issue of delegation to 
agencies of less than statewide jurisdiction is simply not addressed 
in the amendment. The amendment leaves resolution of controver-
sies about such delegation to the courts. 
Lastly, the final version adopts the concept of the Senate proviso, 
though not as broadly and with different, more explicit wording. An 
analysis of the Senate Report shows that the Senate intended fed-
eral preparation for only those impacts which were "out of state" 
and not those impacts which were contained wholly within one state 
but which might have interstate significance. 75 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LEGISLATION 
The negative format of the amendment is unusual and striking: 
"An impact statement shall not be deemed insufficient if .... " 
The legislative history suggests a possible reason for phrasing the 
amendment in this fashion. The confusion regarding NEPA and the 
construction crisis which followed the Conservation Society decision 
prompted congressional concern about the very high standard set by 
73 121 CONGo REC. 7741 (daily ed. July 29, 1975). For full text, see 42 V.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D) 
(Supp. 1976). 
" Conference Report, supra note 4, at 3. 
75 Senate Report, supra note 4, at 11-12. 
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the Second Circuit for delegation of EIS preparation. The practices 
and procedures required of the FHW A by other circuits did not 
equal the level of active participation in EIS preparation which the 
Second Circuit demanded. The simplest way for Congress to relieve 
the pressure for legislation and to register its disapproval with the 
Second Circuit approach was merely to state that that standard was 
too high, without commenting on whether it considered the stan-
dards in the other circuits high enough. 
In trying to deal with the problem in this piecemeal fashion, 
however, Congress usurped the judicial function. A court should 
review the particular fact situation presented and determine 
whether there was compliance with the law. The legislature, on the 
other hand, should take the time to provide courts with the general 
guidance needed to adjudicate future disputes. This involves some 
anticipation of what is necessary for minimum compliance with the 
law rather than merely functioning as a super-judiciary after the 
fact. Here, Congress chose the latter role. The consequence is legis-
lation which leaves many questions unanswered. 
To illustrate the confusion created by the law, consider the nega-
tive format of the amendment, which indicates that it really applies 
in one and only one fact situation. When a court is tempted to 
invalidate an impact statement because of delegation, it must first 
check this amendment. If all the conditions it sets forth are met, the 
court is instructed to validate the statement. The converse, how-
ever, is not true. When the court finds that the conditions specified 
in the amendment are not met, it is not instructed to invalidate the 
impact statement. To the contrary, the court may validate the im-
pact statement anyway, upholding the delegation, because mini-
mum levels of compliance have not been established. 
Despite the negative format, however, the Conference Committee 
was concerned that the courts might nevertheless look to the 
amendment as an implication of minimum requirements. Accord-
ingly, it decided, with respect to one of the four subsections,76 that 
it was better to make its intentions explicit. In order to prevent 
courts from reading section D(i) of the new amendment as establish-
ing that delegation to state agencies of less than statewide jurisdic-
tion was invalid, the conferees chose to add the one-line disclaimer 
at the end of the legislation stating that the validity of such delega-
tion was not addressed by Congress.77 
" 42 V.S.C.A. § 4332(D)(i) (Supp. 1976). See supra, note 73 and accompanying text. 
77 The combined negative format and appended disclaimer in this legislation make its 
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Without the disclaimer, it is unlikely that the courts would have 
read any subsection as creating a minimum standard. Ironically, by 
specifically stating that subsection (i) was not meant to create a 
minimum standard, Congress left the status of subsections (ii), (iii), 
and (iv) uncertain. The omission of similar disclaimers for these 
subsections may lead courts to infer that they do create minimum 
standards. 
In any case, the amendment will not be easy to apply. The condi-
tions included in the amendment are framed in broad terms and the 
exact parameters of required federal participation remain to be de-
fined. In the following overview each subsection of the amendment 
is considered in detail and guidelines are suggested for its applica-
tion. 
(i) Delegation to Statewide Agencies 
The House Report comments, even under its less explicit original 
version of the amendment, that in " ... no case would H.R. 3130 
permit delegation to any state agency lacking sufficient resources, 
personnel, and interdisciplinary expertise to prepare an EIS that 
meets the requirements of NEPA. "78 Even if an agency has state-
wide jurisdiction, it should not be permitted to assume the responsi-
bility for EIS preparation unless it has these additional characteris-
tics. Lacking these, an agency might produce a substantively defi-
cient EIS. Rather than relying on case-by-case substantive analysis 
to ensure adequate impact statements, procedures should be estab-
lished which are designed to minimize the risk that deficient EIS's 
will be written. Further, an agency lacking the necessary abilities 
might choose, in tum, to delegate the EIS preparation to private 
concerns (often those with a financial interest in completion of the 
project) and inadequacy will be replaced with vested interest. A 
major thrust of NEPA is to encourage those officials in planning and 
decision-making capacities to become informed and concerned 
about the environment, both to ensure the most objective evalua-
tion of the project at hand, and to foster the growth of a sense of 
application unclear in instances of delegation to private concerns. Despite the warnings in 
Greene County about relying on statements prepared by applicants, there is growing case law 
involving participation in EIS preparation by private concerns. See supra note 37. When these 
parties have financial interests in obtaining approval of the project, the issue of private 
delegation is an important one and any objections that environmentalists had to delegation 
to states are magnified when such private parties are concerned. Yet a court faced with a 
situation in which there was delegation to private concerns finds no guidance from this 
legislation. 
,. House Report, supra note 4, at 4. 
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environmental responsibility in persons in positions of authority.79 
These officials can encourage the selection, in the first instance, of 
environmentally-sound projects. Since the preparation of an EIS is 
the procedure mandated to effect and ensure the policy and purpose 
of the Act, the responsibility for ·such preparation should rest with 
the sponsoring federal agency. 
Finally, though the proviso clearly permits courts to validate 
EIS's even though responsibility for their preparation was delegated 
to an agency with less than statewide jurisdiction, nothing in the 
amendment mandates or recommends such validation. First, con-
siderations under NEPA are best made by a statewide agency since 
its perspective and jurisdiction will ensure consideration of all the 
ramifications of the project and will allow coordination with other 
plans in the widest region possible. Additionally, a non-statewide 
agency will be more likely to lack the characteristics discussed 
above and will be forced to seek private help in the assessment. 
(ii) Furnish Guidance and Participate 
Courts sustaining delegation procedures often noted that the 
FHWA had furnished guidance and participated in the preparation 
of the EIS's involved. But these courts were never under specific 
legal duty to make such findings,. and hence these cases are not 
particularly helpful in defining this requirement. 8o The reports ac-
companying the new legislation are equally unhelpfu1. 81 Congress 
has enacted these terms into law without offering any insight into 
their meaning. 
A careful reading of the requirement suggests initial interpreta-
tion for the subsection: there must be actual federal participation 
and guidance in the preparation of the impact statement.82 Clearly 
the amount of communication necessary merely for administrative 
purposes whenever the federal government totally or partially funds 
a project will be impressive. Some courts may have mistaken this 
type of administrative involvement for actual participation in prep-
aration of the EIS.83 Similarly, assistance in selection of location or 
" Generally embodied in the concept of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). 
lID Some courts required participation. See supra, notes 27-39 and accompanying text. The 
derivation of "furnish guidance" is uncertain. 
" Senate Report, supra note 4, at 11; Conference Report, supra note 4, at 4-5. 
K2 A court's evaluation of the sufficiency of federal involvement in the preparation of the 
EIS should be totally divorced from any consideration of the substantive merits of the EIS. 
Essex County Preservation Ass'n v. Campbell, 399 F. Supp. 208 (D. Mass. 1975). 
M3 See Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1973); National 
Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 123 (D. Mont. 1972); Citizens Environmen-
tal Council v. Volpe, 364 F. Supp. 286 (D. Kan. 1973); and supra, notes 28, 33, and 34, and 
accompanying text. 
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design, although demonstrating early federal involvement in the 
project, does hot in itself evince any participation in EIS writing. 
To begin with, the federal agency must maintain a "highly 
trained and capable interdisciplinary staff"84 at those levels charged 
with the responsibility to participate and guide.85 Further, those 
levels must have jurisdiction wide enough to provide a perspective 
in which alternatives can meaningfully be considered. The Senate 
Report suggests that". . . the involvement of the Federal official 
should come early and at every critical stage in the preparation of 
the EIS, and should be substantial and continuous."86 This partici-
pation and guidance should consist of several elements. The federal 
agency should make a preliminary study of the proposed project, its 
intended location, and possible affected areas, and make field trips 
to the actual sites to obtain valuable firsthand familiarity with the 
environmental impacts to be considered. On the basis of this study, 
the federal agency should issue guidelines to the state agency re-
garding preparation of the impact statement for that specific pro-
ject.87 There should be continuous contact between the federal and 
state agencies regarding compliance with these guidelines, as well 
as written suggestions by the federal agency for improvement where 
needed. It may be helpful for the federal agency to appoint one 
person from the appropriate office to work full time with the staff 
of the state agency actually preparing the EIS. Such a liaison would 
promote objectivity and full consideration of the impacts through 
continuous involvement in the project. 
When considering the state-prepared impact data, the federal 
agency should spot check findings using its own verifying tech-
niques. The need for this, of course, would vary with the amount of 
continuous federal involvement of the type suggested above. 
The federal agency should participate in the drafting of the EIS. 
Writing, editing, and general preparation can all be effective tools 
of persuasion, and thus actual federal involvement must continue 
through this stage. The federal agency should be certain that the 
EIS evaluates two topics the state agency may unavoidably neglect: 
(1) a consideration of the alternatives beyond the scope of the state 
agency; and (2) the coordination of the project with other plans, 
" Senate Report, supra note 4, at 10-11. 
" The FHWA only maintains such a staff at the regional level. See 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. 
Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, 245 (D. Conn. 1974). 
" Senate Report, supra note 4, at 10. 
M7 Council on Environmental Quality guidelines require similar input. See 40 C.F.R. § 
1500.7(c) (1975). 
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needs, and projects on a wider regional level. 
To prevent unnecessary litigation over the extent of participation, 
the Senate Report suggests that federal agencies "carefully docu-
ment their guidance and participation."88If maintained, such docu-
mentation would not only provide a record for review but would 
force federal agencies to be more aware of their role in the prepara-
tion process. 
(iii) Independent Federal Evaluation of the EIS 
Subsection (iii) requires that, in addition to his participation in 
the preparation stage, the responsible federal official independently 
evaluate the statement prior to its approval and adoption. The 
courts which relied on federal agency review of the EIS to distin-
guish Greene County offer no help in explaining this requirement. 89 
This subsection underscores the fact that in the final analysis the 
federal official remains responsible for the EIS.90 In addition to legal 
responsibility for the document, however, the federal official must 
be prepared to vouch for the contents and scope of the EIS, includ-
ing for example, the empirical accuracy of the data collected and 
the manner in which it is presented. With these responsibilities in 
mind, the meaning of the subsection becomes clear: no state-
prepared EIS should be accepted unless the federal official has care-
fully and completely reviewed the document in order legitimately 
to corroborate its contents.OJ 
Clearly, the extent ofthis undertaking must vary with the amount 
of participation and guidance provided by the federal official in the 
earlier preparation stages of the document. This step is merely a 
final check. 
(iv) Independent Federal Preparation 
This subsection deals with important regional considerations. 
When one state is the beneficiary of a project which might have 
adverse effects beyond its borders, the host state should not be 
entrusted to make the official analysis of the impact on the other 
.. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 11 . 
•• Supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text . 
.. For full text of amendment, see 42 V.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)(Supp. 1976) and text accompa-
nying note 73, supra. 
" Rep. John Dingell, a conferee commenting on the amen,dment, noted that some form of 
written evaluation is appropriate for this subsection. 121 CONG.REC. 4399 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 
1975). In addition, this review must come before the final printing of the document. In 1-291 
Why? Ass'n v. Bums, 372 F. Supp. 223, 245 (D. Conn. 1974) the regional office of the FHWA 
did not see the final draft until it was already in printed form, leaving officials only two 
options: rejection in toto or "rubber stamp" approval. Clearly this was unsatisfactory. See 
also CEQ guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 15oo.7(a) (1975). 
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jurisdiction. First, with everything to lose and nothing to gain, the 
host state has no incentive to prepare an unfavorable assessment of 
the environmental impacts on that other jurisdiction. Second, the 
host state may be incapable of adequately evaluating the project's 
regional impact due to limited financial resources, and a general 
inability to truly understand and study another locality, all crucial 
to an appreciation of the environmental impact of the project. 
The first question which this subsection raises concerns the type 
of impact which warrants notification to that other jurisdiction. The 
legislative history suggests that only physical impacts qualify.92 For 
example, when construction of a highway segment in Vermont will 
affect traffic flow in New Hampshire, or obligate the construction 
or location of connecting arteries, or increase air or water pollution 
in other jurisdictions, this subsection would seem to require notifi-
cation. 93 Economic effects on another jurisdiction, on the other 
hand, would appear to be beyond the contemplation of the section. 
A second question raised by subsection (iv) concerns the serious-
ness of the impact required for early notification. Beyond the 
description "significant," neither the legislation nor the legislative 
history provides insight. 94 When the impact is "significant," the 
subsection may well require notification beyond adjacent states. 
Representative Dingell made the following observation: 
In any case, the spurious charge of further delay and paralysis are ill-
founded if one understands that this section does not require the consid-
eration of some new category of impacts, but rather simply clarifies the 
existing duty to fully consider significant impacts wherever they occur.95 
It is hoped that affected jurisdictions are not only given "early noti-
fication" (early in the planning stages) but are also kept continu-
ously apprised of important developments and changes. The af-
fected jurisdiction must also be given sufficient time to review the 
draft and final statements prepared by the host state in order to 
register any disagreement. 96 
How notification is made is not important as long as it is effec-
tiveY It should be relatively easy to review whether the proper 
., Senate Report, supra note 4, at 11·12. 
93 [d. at 12. 
" [d. at 11, 12. Conference Report, supra note 4, at 4-5. 
" CONGo REc. 4399 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975) . 
.. See text of amendment, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)(iv) (Supp. 1976), and text accompany-
ing note 73, supra. 
" Though not referred to in the legislative history, one possibility is the A-95 review process 
established pursuant to NEPA. Office of Management & Budget Circular A-95, 38 Fed. Reg. 
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agency in the affected jurisdiction was given timely notice and op-
portunity to evaluate the documents. 98 
Finally, if the affected jurisdiction disagrees with the host's anal-
ysis, the federal agency itself must prepare an assessment of that 
particular impact.99 How serious the disagreement must be to war-
rant this special federal involvement remains unclear, although the 
Conference Report suggests any difference in the "characterization, 
extent or likelihood" of such impacts gives rise to the responsibil-
ity}OO When applicable, the federal agency, through broader 
perspectives, with access to expertise and an opportunity for overall 
objectivity, may be able to prepare a report which fairly evaluates 
that impact. 
V. PROBLEMS OF DELEGATION 
This legislation in no sense mandates delegation. The amend-
ment excuses delegation but it does not intend to recommend the 
procedure, which may lead to several problems. Despite the conclu-
sions of several circuits,IOI state applicants for federal grants-in-aid 
sufficiently resemble the private applicants of Greene County to 
warrant concern that they too might produce self-serving EIS's. 
Moreover, delegation inevitably narrows the scope of impact analy-
sis from regional to more local consideration of alternatives. 
A manifestation of this narrowing of scope for highway projects 
is known as "segmentation." The situation in Conservation Society 
illustrates this phenomenon. Although a twenty-mile segment 
(wholly within Vermont) was all that was officially considered, it 
was apparent that a 280 mile superhighway project spanning three 
states and involving a much broader commitment of funds and 
resources was really at stake. 102 Although the FHWA could have 
treated this transportation corridor as a unit, and meaningfully con-
32784 (1973) and proposed revision, 40 Fed. Reg. 47680 (1975). For other existing requirements 
of interstate cooperation, see Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4221 et seq. 
(1970), Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 103(e)(1), 134 (1970), 23 U.S.C. § 109(k) (Supp. 
III, 1973), and Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 1610(c) (1970). 
"' It is not clear from the legislation exactly what agency in the state is to be notified. 
Certainly the only reasonable way to interpret the responsibility of notifying the "state" 
would be to require that either the proper officials or agency is informed. See text of amend-
ment, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)(iv) (Supp. 1976), supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
.. Id. Although this provision should ensure a fair analysis of the impacts when the benefits 
are confined to host states while the effects are felt by other, non-beneficiary states, it would 
be less effective when effects and benefits are shared by all states alike. 
,.0 Conference Report, supra note 4, at 5. 
101 See supra, notes 23-39 and accompanying text. 
102 508 F.2d 927, 934 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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sidered alternatives to highway construction, the Vermont Highway 
Department, under legislative mandate to build this single stretch 
of road did not. The court commented: ". . . development is appar-
ently foreseen as the piecemeal construction of smaller segments, 
each considered on an ad hoc basis."lo3 Segmentation is antithetical 
to the purposes of NEPA, and to the responsibilities it imposes on 
the federal governmentl04 as acknowledged in the FHWA regula-
tions. 105 Yet, delegation and segmentation go hand-in-hand. 
Further, it is not clear whether the states are able to do an ade-
quate job of impact evaluation. Less than half the states have 
adopted state Environmental Policy Acts. lo6 Although there has 
been no in-depth study of their effectiveness, the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality has made this observation: "[ w]hile state 
regulation of environmental affairs is frequently difficult due to a 
lack of expertise and funding, several states ... appear to be on 
the road toward strengthening their EIS processes."I07 Even if the 
states can provide staff equal to the job, there will be unnecessary 
duplication with fifty staffs doing the work that one large super-
staff, relying in part on assistance from local officials, could do more 
efficiently and effectively. Members of Congress, other federal offi-
cials, and the public, all could more easily monitor the performance 
of NEPA responsibilities where there is federal preparation. lOS In 
addition, the qualified staff that would have to be maintained to 
prepare EIS's could influence federal agencies to pursue more envi-
ronmentally sound projects from the outset.100 Consistent federal 
1113 [d. 
H" 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et seq. (1970). 
'.5 "A highway section should be as long as practicable to permit consideration of environ-
mental matters on a broad scope and meaningful evaluation of alternatives .... Piecemeal-
ing proposed highway improvements in separate EIS's is to be avoided .... " 23 C.F.R. 
771.5(a)(1975). See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 
835 (D.C.Cir. 1972). 
, .. The following states have adopted comprehensive regulations for EIS's: California, Con-
necticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, South Da-
kota, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Puerto Rico; the following states have adopted 
comprehensive Executive Orders for Administrative Orders for EIS's: Michigan, New Jersey, 
Nevada, and Texas; the following states have limited or special EIS requirements: Arizona, 
Delaware, Georgia, and Nebraska. 6 CEQ ANN. REP., Appendix NEPA ch. (1975) (draft) .. 
10' [d. at 49. 
,., Notis-McConarty, Federal Accountability: HUD Delegation of NEPA Responsibility, 5 
ENV. AFF. 121 (1976). 
, •• One response of the FHWA to this suggestion was made by Francis C. Turner, Federal 
Highway Administrator in 1970. He noted that the volume of highway projects was so large 
(at that time 7-10,000 per year) that it would be impossible to staff the agency adequately to 
handle all impact statements in Washington, and so it was necessary to take a "calculated 
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preparation would allow the type of coordinated, systematic consid-
eration of plans and their alternatives that the authors of NEPA 
envisaged. It would allow the consideration of alternatives which 
often extend beyond the scope of the agency to which preparation 
is delegated. IIO 
Finally, delegation presents problems for judicial administration. 
Case-by-case determinations of the quantum offederal involvement 
in a state prepared document are more difficult than application of 
a per se rule that state prepared EIS's are simply invalid. 111 Litiga-
tion under the new standard will involve difficult issues of proof and 
line drawing. In each case where authorship is contested, there will 
be protracted litigation rather than the administration of a flat rule, 
which, if enforced, would eliminate any need for litigation. 
VI. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 
How shall the burden of preparing impact statements be distrib-
uted in the future? By passing the NEPA amendment, and thereby 
opening the door to state preparation, Congress may be interpreted 
as giving sub silentio approval to the circuit court trend of sanction-
ing state preparation as long as there is the slightest hint of federal 
involvement. 1I2 If this occurs, courts could become increasingly lib-
eral in their application of the Act. The subsequent history of the 
Conservation Society litigation indicates the seriousness of this pos-
sibility. 
chance" that local and regional offices could handle environmental problems in response to 
policies set in Washington. Hearings on the Implementation of NEPA as it Relates to the 
Planning and Construction of Highways Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Sen. Comm. 
on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-21 (1970). Likewise current Federal Highway Admin-
istrator Tiemann made a similar objection with respect to H.R. 3130 after it passed the 
Senate. See supra, note 68. The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4221, 4222 
(1970) suggests one way to pay for such a staff. Rather than delegate the responsibility to 
prepare impact statements to the states, federal agencies could prepare the statements them-
selves and then use this Act to justify charging the states a fee for the service. Such a scheme 
would not only keep the federal government maximally involved in the EIS process, but 
would also encourage states to suggest projects they truly feel are environmentally sound 
(instead of those that can be made to look environmentally sound by EIS sleight of hand). 
See also Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1952, 31 U.S.C. § 483(a)(1970), and The 
Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1952: Who Should Pay for Preparing the Impact 
Statements? 3 E.L.R. 10059, and follow-up article, More on the Independent Offices Appro-
priation Act of 1952, 3 E.L.R. 10086 (1973). These articles were cited by the Second Circuit 
in Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transportation, 508 F.2d 927, 932 (2d Cir. 1974). 
II. For a more detailed discussion about the ability of state highway departments to fully 
consider alternatives, see Comment, The Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements 
by State Highway Commissions, 58 IOWA L. REv. 1268 (1973). 
'" 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, 246, n. 72 (D. Conn. 1974). 
"' Supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text. 
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Upon remand, the Second Circuit disappointed environmen-
talists by yielding their position to a greater extent than was really 
necessary under the circumstances. The court correctly concluded 
that H.R. 3130 was a direct response to the first Conservation 
Society decision, and that Congress meant to reject the holding of 
that caseY3 Congress' displeasure, however, focused more on the 
strict standard enunciated by the Second Circuit than on the find-
ings that in that particular case, there was insufficient federal par-
ticipation. Indeed, the findings of the district court, as underscored 
by the dissent in Conservation Society II,114 indicated so little fed-
eral involvement that the court could have maintained the injunc-
tion against the Route 7 project by finding that, even under the 
relaxed standards established by the amendment, there had not 
been adequate federal participation. The court chose instead to vali-
date the impact statement.1I5 Needless to say, Conservation Society 
II was a most inauspicious start for the new law. For the circuit, 
which before had been so vehement in its insistence on federal prep-
aration, to decline to invest this new law with any substance, was 
not encouraging to say the least. 
Another threat to NEPA looms on an entirely different front. 
Although FHWA initially sponsored H.R. 3130, it was not entirely 
satisfied with the enacted version.1I8 Anxious to reduce NEPA re-
sponsibilities to the vanishing point, FHWA sponsored a provision 
in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1975 that would have allowed 
the FHWA to shift the responsibilities, originally assigned to it by 
Congress, onto the state.1I7 Under this procedure, the Governor of a 
state may be "certified" as the "responsible official" to fulfill the 
various requirements imposed on the federal agency, thus relieving 
the federal agency of legal responsibility for those duties. Certifica-
tion is already in practice with respect to other FHWA responsibili-
ties. IlS The procedure differs quite markedly from that sustained by 
"' 531 F.2d 637, 639 (2d Cir. 1976) . 
... Id. at 640. 
"·Id. 
II. Public Works Comm. Chairman Rep. James J. Howard, the only conferee who did not 
affirm the Conference Report, issued a "Dear Colleague" letter on JUly 25, 1975, urgipg 
rejection ofthe Report and reflecting FHWA's view of the bill. The Public Works Comm. has 
jurisdiction over the highway program, and managed to muster unusually high opposition 
(143 votes against) to the Conference Report. The final vote was 279-143.121 CONGo REC. 7741 
(daily ed. JUly 29, 1975). 
"' H.R. 8430, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1976 was 
enacted as H.R. 8235, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See note 120, infra. 
11K Morganthaler, On the Road Again: Certification Acceptance Forces NEPA to Adapt, 4 
1976] AMENDING NEPA 295 
H.R. 3130, which, even though allowing state preparation of impact 
statements, still requires federal participation and leaves the Fed-
eral official responsible for the "scope, objectivity, and content of 
the entire statement."IID When Congress passed the Federal-Aid 
Highway Act in April, 1976, it included certain certification provi-
sions but not those regarding NEP A responsibilities. 120 FHW A thus 
failed to succeed in this effort to be relieved of its NEPA responsibil-
ities, but the possibility of the enactment of a similar provision in 
the future remains a very real threat to the continued vitality of 
NEPA.121 
CONCLUSION 
These events threatened an erosion of NEPA, and an abandon-
ment of its purposes and procedures. But H.R. 3130 can have an-
other effect. It can offer an opportunity to restate a national com-
mitment to the analysis and evaluation of the environmental im-
pact of governmental projects. It is possible to permit state partici-
pation in the preparation ofNEPA statements without undermining 
the basis of NEP A. States must be encouraged to develop their 
expertise in environmental science and to assume the responsibili-
ties that a meaningful Environmental Policy Act involves. In addi-
tion, the participation and cooperation of the host state and all 
affected st"ates is crucial to a comprehensive analysis of a planned 
project. At the same time, the courts must not be reticent in apply-
ing H.R. 3130. Rather, they must ensure that the amendment re-
quires substantial and continuous federal participation in EIS prep-
E.L.R. 50023, 50030 (1974). The author comments that certification has already limited the 
degree to which FHWA can effectively review environmental impact, since FHWA involve-
ment comes at such an advanced stage that meaningful evaluation of alternatives is fore-
closed. See also Federal Highway Administration Launches New Effort to Win Congressional 
Reduction of Its NEPA Obligations. 5 E.L.R. 10177 (1975). 
119 See text of the amendment, 42 U.S.C.A. 4332 §(2)(D) (Supp. 1976) and text accompany-
ing note 73, supra. 
120 See H.R. 8235, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), particularly sections to amend 23 U.S.C. § 
117(1970); 122 CONGo REc. 3060 (daily ed. April 7, 1976) (reported in House by Comm. on 
Conference). This bill as reported contained provisions authorizing certification procedures 
for some FHWA responsibilities under federal law, but not those for NEPA responsibilities 
as provided for in unenacted H.R. 8430. Though there is no danger of certification of NEPA 
responsibilities at present, the fact that FHWA requested it once, and the fact that the agency 
did achieve some certification privileges in this recent Act suggest that the issue may arise 
again in future bills. 
121 The Department of Housing and Urban Development achieved exemption under certain 
programs in 1974. See 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974), 40 Fed. Reg. 1392 (1975), and 
Notis-McConarty, Federal Accountability: HUD Delegation of NEPA Responsibility, 5 ENV. 
AFF. 121 (1976).· 
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aration. Then, faithful adherence to NEPA, even as amended, can 
guarantee comprehensive and valuable environmental assessment 
of federal projects. 
